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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The inspiration for this thesis is taken from the pending advisory opinion at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the declaration of independence issued by 
the authorities of Kosovo on February 17 2008. On 8 October 2008, the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA/GA) requested the Court to answer the following question: 
Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law? 
Although the question is narrowly framed, and the question of remedial secession is 
therefore not the primary focus for the ICJ, it was addressed by a significant number of 
states in their oral proceedings (OP,) written statements (WS,) and written comments to 
other statements (WC) before the Court.  
1.2 Presentation of the legal question 
This thesis addresses two separate questions:  
1. If there existed a right to remedial secession in 2008, did the people
1
 of Kosovo 
have this right when they declared independence? In other words, did the people of 
Kosovo satisfy the criteria for establishing their own state on part Serbia's territory 
without Serbian consent? This question is addressed in Chapter 3.  
2. If there did not exist a right to remedial secession before 2008, has the case of 
Kosovo, including the proceedings before the ICJ, contributed to the development 
of such a right in customary international law? This is addressed in Chapter 4.  
                                                 
1
 The question of what constitutes a people is not considered. It will be assumed that the Kosovars constitute a 
"people." 
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1.3 What this thesis does not concern 
This thesis does not attempt to predict the conclusion of ICJs opinion. Most fundamentally, 
the ICJ was only directly asked about the legality of the declaration of independence issued 
by the authorities of Kosovo. It is therefore not certain that the Court will address the 
question of remedial secession at all.  
Even if the Court were to address the question, it may decide to do so through arguments 
not considered in this thesis. This thesis only considers the right to remedial secession in 
general international law. It therefore does not consider obligations or other legal 
consequences stemming from United Nations Security Council (UNSC/SC) Resolution 
1244, and offers no interpretation of this document. 
1.4 The proceedings before the ICJ 
43 states, plus the authorities of Kosovo, participated in the proceedings. Of these, 27 
supported Kosovo, 16 opposed independence, while the submission of Egypt did not 
conclude on this question.
2
  
24 states plus Kosovo addressed the question of remedial secession. 14 delegations argued 
in favour of such a right, while 11 opposed that a right to remedial secession exists in 
international law.  
These numbers will be relied on in the following. They are however based on my own 
assessment, and are open to judgement. Some of the statements are very unclear, 
particularly as regards the right to remedial secession. As it is hard to believe that states 
have not prepared their statements with great care, these unclarities are most likely 
deliberate, so as not to commit too strongly to any certain position.  
                                                 
2
  See annex 
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1.5 Legal significance 
The answer to these questions, and in particular to question one above, is of course firstly 
important for Kosovo. As will become evident however, Kosovo has already been 
recognised as an independent state by a significant number of states. Their process towards 
independence is therefore arguably likely to proceed independent of any legal entitlement, 
instead dependent on de facto recognition and efficiency. 
The greatest significance therefore concerns other situations than Kosovo. Many states 
have “peoples” within their borders wanting to secede, the Basques of Spain and France 
and the inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia only being two prominent 
examples. For such groups, and for their parent states, the extent of a right to secession is 
of vital importance.  
It may be asked what significance this thesis may have considering an opinion of the Court 
will be given within the next few months. 
Firstly, the Court's jurisdiction is only advisory. As will be expanded upon below, such 
advisory opinions have no binding effect in international law. Secondly, the Court was not 
directly asked about the right to remedial secession. Any remarks on this point will 
therefore be in the form of an obiter dictum, that at least according to traditional legal 
theory carry less weight than the ratio decidendi.
3
 Thirdly, the Court will only have to 
consider sources up to Kosovo's declaration of independence. They will therefore most 
likely not consider the arguments of the states before the Court as evidence of customary 
international law.  
Chapter 4 will show that the ICJ case for this reason is important on its own merits. Here 
states for the first time argued coherently their view of international law, or at least how 
they want the law to be. Customary international law is created through the practice of 
states, together with the belief that this practice constitutes the law (opinio juris). By 
                                                 
3
 In the Norwegian context, see Eckhoff p.171-175 
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constituting these two components, the proceedings arguably have potential in themselves 
to change the law.  
1.6 Arguments employed 
This dual nature of the statements before the Court, being both arguments and determinants 
of international law, creates a certain challenge of presentation. However, when analyzing 
whether Kosovo had a right to remedial secession in 2008, the statements of various states 
in 2009 can naturally not in themselves be considered as having contributed to international 
law.  
For this reason chapter 2, which analyzes the right to remedial secession as it existed in 
2008, excludes the arguments of states from consideration. Chapter 3, concerning whether 
Kosovo had such a right, draws on state arguments as regards Kosovo's factual, but not 
legal situation. Chapter 4 then presents the legal arguments made before the Court, and 
examines their significance for international law.  
1.7 Structure, priorities and conclusions 
The structure of the thesis may appear somewhat confusing. I will therefore use a few 
words to explain:  
Chapter 2 is a presentation of the theoretical background for a right to remedial secession. 
It is however not an attempt to analyze in detail whether such a right existed in 2008. This 
has been analyzed many times before, and after the case of Kosovo it is arguably of lesser 
significance for international law. 
Chapter 3 then assumes that a right to remedial secession existed in 2008. From this 
premise it examines whether the people of Kosovo fulfilled the conditions for creating their 
own state when they declared independence. It concludes that this is doubtful, but that this 
most likely will have few implications for the independence of Kosovo.  
 8 
Chapter 4 works from the opposite premise that a right to remedial secession did not exist 
before 2008. It then asks whether the recognition by various states of Kosovo, and in 
particular the proceedings before the Court, have contributed to the emergence of such a 
rule of customary international law. It is concluded that the combination of fourteen 
delegations arguing in favour of a right to remedial secession, the recognition of Kosovo by 
various states, and only eleven states protesting against these developments, significantly 
strengthens the claim that there is now a right to remedial secession in international law. 
As will be seen, question 2 is examined at greater length and detailed than question 1. This 
is so for several reasons. Firstly, whether Kosovo had a right to remedial secession is 
largely a factual question. Without having detailed knowledge of the factual situation, it is 
difficult to make a definite assessment of whether such a right existed. Secondly, as already 
argued, the answer to question one arguably has few practical consequences, whereas the 
question of remedial secession after Kosovo is a significant question of international law.  
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2 Remedial secession in international law – before Kosovo 
2.1 Principles regulating a right to secession.  
At least since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the international system has been based 
around the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any right to secession, 
that is, the right for a people to create their own state on part of the territory of the parent 
state, is therefore an exception to this principle. This exception must be based on another of 
what Cassese calls “fundamental principles”4 – the right to self-determination.  
2.1.1 Territorial integrity 
The territorial integrity of states is a cornerstone of international relations. It is routinely 
recited in most international legal documents, but its most cited expression is article 2 (4) 
of the UN Charter:  
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.  
Materially, the principle provides that states cannot violate the territorial borders or the 
internal sovereignty of other member states. Understandably, this principle is fundamental 
to the functioning of international law, as it provides stability and security within the 
international system. 
2.1.2 Self-determination of peoples 
Also this principle can be traced back at least to the Treaty of Westphalia and its principles 
of minority rights, and later the first modern constitutions of the late 18
th
 century.
5
 At this 
time, and for early writers such as Rousseau however, the principle was not seen as a 
                                                 
4
 Cassese p.86 
5
 Depaigne  
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challenge, but rather as the corollary to territorial integrity. Self-determination was the new 
legitimating factor for the rulers, substituting the divine or royal rule that had preceded it.
6
 
The first modern expression of a right to self-determination as a principle of international 
law came in Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points. The principle was however not included in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, although its influence can be seen in protection that 
minorities were awarded in this document.
7
 Still at that point however, the principle was 
seen as a corollary to the idea of the nation-state, the belief that each state was to represent 
one nation and that this legitimated its existence.  
This was also the meaning of Article 1 and 55 of the UN Charter.
8
 Stating merely that 
“respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” is important for 
maintaining “stability and well-being” among nations, these provisions were arguably little 
more than rules against intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
With the advent of decolonization after World War II however, the right to self-
determination began taking on another meaning, by giving an explicit right to self-
determination for non-state entities. In General Assembly Resolution 1514 it was declared 
that 
[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
Resolution 1514 had the title “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples,” and was therefore limited to the colonial context. In 1966 
however, the exact same phrase was repeated in Article 1 of both of the new human rights 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Shaw p.251 
8
 Crawford p.128 
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conventions. With these documents, the right to self-determination was therefore 
established as a general principle.  
This “unquestionable and inalienable”9 right was further developed in General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 with its Friendly Relations Declaration, stating that  
by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all people have the right freely to 
determine … their political status. 
According to Shaw, this declaration did not merely confirm a right to self-determination in 
its own right, but was also “specifically intended to act as an elucidation of certain 
important Charter provisions.”10 As it was adopted without opposition, it therefore 
provided an authoritative interpretation, and arguably an expansion of the meaning of the 
original Charter provisions. In Cassese's terminology, the Friendly Relations Declaration 
added the principle of self-determination to the list of fundamental principles governing 
international relations.
11
 
The principle of self-determination has therefore undoubtedly “acquired a status beyond 
convention and is considered a general principle of international law.”12 Its importance was 
further confirmed by the ICJ in the East Timor case, where the Court stated that 
the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from 
United Nations practice, has en erga omnes character, is irreproachable. ... it is one 
of the essential principles of contemporary international law
13
 
                                                 
9
 ACHR para.20 
10
 Shaw p.254 
11
 Cassese p.87 
12
 Quebec para.114 
13
 East Timor p.16 
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To sum up, the right to self-determination today gives any group constituting a people the 
right to determine their own political status and how they will be governed, without any 
influence by any other force or power. As an erga omnes obligation, all states have an 
equal responsibility to protect and ensure this right.
14
 
2.1.3 Resolving the tension between the principles 
There exists a much larger number of potential peoples than states in the world. An 
unrestricted right to self-determination will therefore conflict with the territorial integrity of 
states. As both principles are fundamental norms of international law, they do not form a 
hierarchy. Instead, international law must weigh them against each other. 
That said, territorial integrity has traditionally been given priority in international law. As 
will be seen in chapter 2.4.2 there are therefore few, if any examples in modern history of 
peoples being allowed to secede in the name of self-determination.  
This does however not mean that self-determination as a principle is ignored. Instead, 
international law has made a distinction between internal and external self-determination, 
where all peoples are only entitled to the former. As the Canadian Supreme Court noted in 
the Quebec case,  
international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by 
peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the 
maintenance of territorial integrity of those states.
15
 
That self-determination is primarily an internal right is also evident in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, passed by 143 states
16
 in the General 
Assembly in 2007. In addition to reaffirming the existence of such a right, article 3 and 4 
also express the core material content: 
                                                 
14
 Shaw p.124 
15
 Quebec para.122 
16
 BBC News 13.09.2007 
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Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, 
as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous function. 
In other words, a right to internal self-determination is a right to internal autonomy, a right 
for a people to choose its own political organization and to exercise it without coercion.
17
 
Again quoting the Canadian Supreme Court, it is a right for a people to pursue “its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing 
state.”18  
The question of remedial secession concerns the consequences if this internal right is not 
respected by the parent state. In such exceptional circumstances, do the people have the 
right to break out and create their own state? The remainder of the thesis concerns this 
question.  
2.2 Is the right to secession regulated by international law? 
Some argue that the question of a non-state entity's right to secede is not regulated by 
international law.
19
 This is based on international law being viewed exclusively as a law 
among states, the principle of territorial integrity and other principles and rules of 
international law not regulating the actions of non-state actors. A people can therefore not 
                                                 
17
 Crawford p.128 
18
 Quebec para.126 
19
 Kohen p.474 
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violate international law even if they challenge the territorial integrity of the parent state. 
Instead, whether the secession is successful or not depends on efficiency and recognition. 
Secession is under this view seen as “a legal fact, not a legal act.”20 
The argument that international law does not regulate secession can however be criticized. 
Firstly, one can ask whether the traditional view of the actions of non-state actors not being 
regulated by international law remains valid today. Increasingly not only rights, but also 
obligations, are extended to non-state entities. Institutions such as the International 
Criminal Court have shown that individuals can be held responsible under international 
law. Numerous Security Council resolutions have addressed non-state actors directly, for 
example Security Council Resolution 1203 on Kosovo itself, where paragraph 4 demanded  
also that the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo 
Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 
1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo.  
Secondly, we remember that both fundamental principles are obligations erga omnes. 
Although this does not in itself mean that the principle applies to non-state actors,
21
 it does 
mean that all states have a legal obligation to ensure the right to self-determination for all 
peoples. If this right is not respected internally, the question of whether this right can be 
exercised externally must arguably also be a legal question.  
Even if one accepts that the principle of territorial integrity does not apply to non-state 
actors therefore, and that a people can therefore not violate international law by attempting 
to secede, states will violate international law if they deny a people a right to self-
determination. Even if one argues that statehood is largely dependent on recognition 
therefore, the erga omnes responsibility to ensure self-determination may give states a legal 
duty to recognise this entity.  
                                                 
20
 Ibid p.471 
21
 See Barcelona Traction p.33 
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Another argument for this is the treatment of past secessionist movements. Almost without 
exception, the international community has refused to recognize the entity as a state, often 
at the Security Council's request.
22
 If there are legal rules preventing entities from 
becoming states, the question of whether there in certain cases exists a right for an entity to 
secede, and a corresponding duty for other states to recognize the seceding entity, must also 
be regulated by international law.  
2.3 Arguments in favour of a right to remedial secession 
2.3.1 International legal theory 
Substantial international theory has in later years argued that there exists a right to remedial 
secession in international law.
23
 However, according to the ICJ statutes Article 38 (1) (d),
24
 
the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” are only to be 
considered as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”  
Teachings of various scholars therefore generally carry little independent weight as sources 
of international law. In most areas, legal theory instead has a clarifying and structural role, 
making coherent arguments based on existing legal evidence. In the words of Shaw, 
textbooks are therefore primarily “used as a method of discovering what the law is on any 
particular point rather than as the fount or source of actual rules.”25 
That international legal theorists argue in favour of a right to remedial secession therefore 
has little independent value. Instead, we must turn to the arguments that they employ, and 
ask if these arguments are sufficient to support their claim.  
                                                 
22
 See 2.4.2 below 
23
 See for example Tomuschat p.42, Cassese (1995) p.118 
24
 See 2.3.6 below 
25
 Shaw p.113 
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2.3.2 The Åland Islands 
Among the earliest sources touching upon a right to secession is the process concerning the 
Åland Islands. The question was whether these islands were allowed under international 
law to secede from Finland and instead become part of Sweden, with whom they shared 
their cultural heritage. The League of Nations first appointed a Commission of Jurists to 
investigate, and then a Commission of Rapporteurs to determine how to solve the matter. 
The Rapporteurs firstly concluded that there was no general right to secession in 
international law. This was based on the assumption that 
[t]o concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a 
population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, 
because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and 
stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life.
26
  
That there is no general right to secession is not controversial, and follows from the 
principle of territorial integrity as a fundamental norm.
27
 It is also confirmed in other 
international documents, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discriminations (CERD) General Recommendation XXI paragraph 6 declaring that 
“international law has not recognized a general right of peoples unilaterally to declare 
secession from a State.” 
Secondly however, the Commission of Rapporteurs concluded that the rights of the citizens 
of Åland could be satisfied internally through Finland giving them significant autonomy. A 
right to secession was therefore not granted. Of central importance is however the 
suggestion that  
[t]he separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its 
incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional 
                                                 
26
 Rapporteurs p.22-23 
27
 See 2.1 above 
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solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and 
apply just and effective guarantees.
28
 
This seems to suggest that in exceptional circumstances, a people may in fact have a right 
to remedial secession. According to the Commission of Rapporteurs however, such a right 
can in any case only be exercised as a last resort.  
2.3.3 General Assembly Resolution 2625 and other declarations 
The most important source for those arguing a right to remedial secession is the Friendly 
Relations Declaration in General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970. This resolution, 
guaranteeing the self-determination and equal rights of peoples, declares in paragraph 7 
that 
[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self- determination 
of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour. 
This paragraph is read by many so that if a state does not respect peoples' right to self-
determination, the state loses the unconditional right to have its territorial sovereignty 
respected.
29
 Instead the other fundamental norm, the right to self-determination, grants the 
people whose rights have been violated a right to secede from the parent state. The same 
statement has since been repeated in other human rights documents, such as Article 2 of 
1993 Vienna Declaration and CERD General Comment XXI paragraph 6.  
                                                 
28
 Rapporteurs p.28 
29
 Kirgis (1994) p.306 
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2.3.4 Other international decisions 
Several international decisions have investigated the relationship between self-
determination and territorial integrity. One such case was the ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Western Sahara. The background for this opinion was the decolonization of Morocco, 
where after Spain decided to maintain control over the areas known as Western Sahara. 
Morocco claimed that these areas belonged to them, while Western Sahara, with the 
support of Algeria, demanded independence.  
The Court’s opinion was interpreted differently by the different sides to the conflict, and 
the conclusion is not important. Of greater significance were parts of the opinion of the 
Court. According to Crawford, the “Western Sahara case strongly affirmed the right of the 
people of the territory to determine their future political status,”30 even if both Morocco and 
Mauritania claimed that the area belonged to them. This seems to be based on the 
penultimate paragraph of the opinion, considering “the principle of self-determination 
through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory.” 
However, as the Court did not conclude that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had a definite 
claim to the area, the opinion can not necessarily be taken to mean that self-determination 
was to take precedence over territorial integrity.
31
 
Another notable case is the Katangese Peoples' Congress vs. Zaire before the African 
Commission on Human and People’s rights. After Congo had gained independence from 
Belgium in 1960, Katanga declared their independence from Congo only a few days later. 
The attempt failed under international pressure however, and under the next decades 
Katanga remained a dissatisfied member of Congo/Zaire. In 1992 the authorities of 
Katanga made a complaint to the African Commission, asking them to declare Katanga’s 
right as an independent state.  
                                                 
30
 Crawford p.123 
31
 Summers p.315 
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The Commission however could not agree with this, finding in Zaire’s favour. Interestingly 
however, the Commission came to this result by declaring that  
[i]n the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that 
the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the absence of 
evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in 
Government as guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission 
holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination 
that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.
32
 
The Commission therefore does seem to suggest that if these rights had not been respected, 
the right to self-determination would possibly have to prevail at the expense of Zaire’s 
territorial integrity.  
2.3.5 Re. Secession of Quebec 
Another important source for the proponents of a right to remedial secession is the 1998 
advisory opinion on Quebec by the Supreme Court of Canada. One of the questions asked 
the Court by the Canadian government included the following: 
... is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the 
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to affect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
33
 
In the specific case, the Court found that Quebec did not have a right to secession from 
Canada. For the proponents of a right to remedial secession however, the decision is 
important as it did not rule out a right to secession where a people are denied the right to 
internal self-determination.
34
 According to the Court, the  
                                                 
32
 Katanga para.6 
33
 Quebec para.2 
34
 Crawford p.41 
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right to self-determination … generates, at best, a right to external self- 
determination … where a definable group is denied meaningful access to 
government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development.
35
 
2.3.6 Evaluating the evidence 
Having seen the evidence in support of a right to remedial secession, the question is 
whether these documents are sufficient to establish a rule of international law. 
The starting point must be taken in the ICJ statutes article 38:  
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a) international convention, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law 
Although formally only listing the sources that the ICJ are to consider when determining 
the existence of international law, this provision is generally acknowledged as representing 
the general international legal method.
36
  
None of the above documentation falls in under any of the primary sources of international 
law. The works of distinguished theorists is listed as a subsidiary means, and as noted have 
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 Quebec para.138 
36
 Ulfstein and Ruud p.48 
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little independent value as a source in international law. As regards Åland, the question was 
never decided by an international court. While the Commissions consisted of judicial 
experts, their report arguably constitute little more than judicial theory. In addition, this 
decision is today almost 90 years old. As have already been seen, international law 
including the right to self-determination has changed significantly over this time. 
Judicial decisions are also listed as a subsidiary means. In this context, only the Western 
Sahara opinion clearly fits this label. The Katanga opinion of the African Commission is 
not strictly a judicial decision, and falls somewhere in between Åland and Western Sahara 
as regards legal significance. As regards Western Sahara, advisory opinions under Chapter 
IV of the ICJ statutes are indeed advisory, with no binding effect. This is further subject to 
article 59 of the statutes, which underlines that there is no strict system of precedents in 
international law. Although the Court is therefore not bound by their earlier opinions 
however, a lack of consistency would clearly undermine the Court's authority. There is 
therefore nevertheless a presumption that the Court will follow the same path as in past 
cases. Interestingly, in the South West Sahara case, the Court themselves seemingly 
signalled this quite strongly, stating that  
[t]he absence of binding force does not transform the judicial operation into a legal 
consultation, which may be made use of or not according to choice. The advisory 
opinion determines the law applicable to the question put; … no position adopted 
contrary to the Court's pronouncement will have any effectiveness whatsoever in 
the legal sphere.
37
 
Concerning the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is somewhat unclear what 
weight national court decisions carry under international law. A first question is whether 
the provision of Article 38 (1) (d) also includes national Court decisions. On the one hand, 
the text itself only refers to “judicial decisions.” A textual interpretation therefore puts 
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national and international decisions on the same level. Shaw also concludes that “'judicial 
decisions' also encompasses … the ruling of national courts.”38  
On the other hand, it is hard to accept that national and international decisions carry the 
same weight. Alternatively, one could therefore see national decisions as state practice, 
which may contribute to the formation of international customary law.
39
 Under any 
circumstance the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada therefore carries some, albeit 
limited, weight under international law.  
Finally, concerning General Assembly Resolution 2625 and later articulations of the same 
principle, such resolutions are not among the sources listed in Article 38. It is however 
commonly accepted today that this list is not exhaustive, and such resolutions are clearly 
relevant in the determination of international law.
40
 They do however not have any binding 
force, and are therefore primarily important as evidence of a customary international law 
reflecting the opinions of states.
41
  
2.4 A right to remedial secession in customary international law? 
2.4.1 Introduction 
As seen, none of these sources are binding under international law, and each of them 
carries significant limits to the weight that can be attached to them. None of these sources 
can therefore in themselves justify a claim that there exists a right to remedial secession. 
The question instead becomes whether these sources, together with other state practice, 
may constitute a customary law to this effect. 
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2.4.2 State practice and opinio juris? 
In the ICJ statutes article 38 (1) (b) customary law, as a primary source of international 
law, is defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” For international 
customary law to exist, two components must therefore be present: state practice, and 
opinio juris. For the present,
42
 state practice can be defined as how a state is behaving.
43
 
This includes all physical acts, but also written documents and correspondence, as well as 
oral statements made by states, both nationally and internationally. Opinio juris can be 
defined as a belief that the practice is carried out due to a perceived legal obligation.  
State practice therefore firstly includes the sources accounted for above. For example as 
regards the Supreme Court of Canada, Malanczuk notes that “the legislature and the 
judiciary form part of a state just as much as the executive does”44 and concludes that the 
decisions of national courts constitute state practice. As regards the practice of international 
organizations, the International Law Commission has noted that the “record of cumulative 
practice of [such] organizations may be regarded as evidence of customary international 
law...”45 In the 1984 Nicaragua case the ICJ found that the existence of opinio juris could 
“though with all due caution, be deduced from … the attitude of States' towards certain 
General Assembly resolutions”, in this context particularly referring to Resolution 2625.46  
In addition to these sources, one must primarily seek evidence for state practice in how 
states have reacted to other secessionist attempts in the past.  
The largest group of examples concerning a right to secession comes from the process of 
decolonization, where a large number of states gained independence from colonial powers. 
Decolonization was arguably qualitatively different than secessions outside the colonial 
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context however, as former independent peoples were given back the independence that 
had previously been taken from them. Importantly, this was largely done with the consent 
of the colonial powers, and therefore did not challenge the principle of territorial integrity 
in the way that a right to remedial secession without the consent of the parent state would 
do. Many of the international sources legitimating this process, such as General Assembly 
Resolution 1514, were also explicitly limited to the colonial context. The process of 
decolonization can therefore generally not be considered support for a right to remedial 
secession.  
The most commonly referred example of a successful secession outside the colonial 
context is the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan, becoming Bangladesh. While this 
may seem like a clear example of secession against the wishes of the parent state, this can 
clearly be questioned. Firstly, no state or international body, including the Security Council 
and General Assembly, argued in favour of a right to secession for Bangladesh until the 
Pakistani army had been defeated.
47
 Secondly, independence was only achieved with 
significant help from the Indian Army.
48
 Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, 
Bangladesh was not admitted as a member of the United Nations, arguably the yardstick for 
whether an entity is considered a state, until Pakistan accepted this in 1974. Finally, as the 
circumstances surrounding the secession were so particular, several authors refer to 
Bangladesh as a sui generis case, rather than as an example of remedial secession.
49
 
A second possible example is the independence of Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s. 
According to Dugard and Raic, “it was the secession of several federal republics that led to 
the dissolution of the SFRY.”50 This however seems like a dubious claim. As is perhaps 
evident from the quote itself, most scholars accept that Yugoslavia was a process of 
dissolution rather than secession.
51
 When Croatia and Bosnia gained their independence, 
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the Yugoslavian central authority had in effect ceased to exist. There was therefore no 
central government to protest, and no territorial integrity to violate.
52
 It is illustrating that 
even in such a situation however, these states were not admitted as UN members until 
Yugoslavia had reconstituted itself and announced its intention to recognize the new 
republics.
53
 
There are indeed very few, if any, examples of successful remedial secessions outside the 
process of decolonization. On the other hand, there have been many cases where a right to 
secession has been denied. Among the most prominent and widely debated are the cases of 
Katanga, Biafra, Chechnya, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
54
 In all these 
cases, the international community rejected a right to secession, and instead confirmed the 
territorial integrity of the parent states. This was also the fate of the 1991 Kosovo 
proclamation of independence.
55
 
On this basis it is tempting to conclude with Summers that “[r]emedial secession … suffers 
from a notable lack of state practice.”56 However, and perhaps significantly, these 
rejections of secessionist movements each seem to have happened because of specific 
circumstances. For example, the Security Council resolutions urging non-recognition 
Rhodesia justified this specifically by referring to the “illegal racist minority regime” that 
governed the territory.
57
 In the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the 
external aggression by Turkey was used as the basis for rejection.
58
 In other cases again, 
such as Chechnya, the international community has simply addressed the conflict as an 
internal matter that Russia must rectify as it sees necessary.
59
 
                                                 
52
 Ibid p.396 
53
 Ibid p.401 
54
 For more examples, see Crawford p.403 
55
 Weller p.38 
56
 Summers p.345 
57
 SC Res 216 
58
 Crawford p.133 
59
 Ibid p.410 
 26 
Importantly therefore, when dealing with these cases, no state nor international body has 
ever argued that a right to remedial secession does not exist. As it makes the easiest and 
most consistent argument, one would expect states to argue this way if they believed they 
could. Instead the international community has found it necessary to examine the specific 
circumstances in each case, and justify the rejection on violations of international law other 
than the act of secession itself.  
The refusal to argue directly against a right to remedial secession arguably qualifies not 
only as state practice, but also satisfies the requirement of opinio juris.
60
 If we accept that 
opinio juris can be determined indirectly through the actions of states,
61
 the refusal to argue 
generally against a right to remedial secession when rejecting secessionist movements 
show exactly that states did not believe such a rule to exist. Also the requirement of opinio 
juris is thereby arguably satisfied.  
Ironically then perhaps, the cases of rejected secessions may provide the strongest state 
practice and opinio juris for the existence of a right to remedial secession under customary 
international law.
62
 By having to resort to different arguments in different situations, states 
have arguably acknowledged that peoples' in principle may have a right to remedial 
secession. Together with GA Resolution 2625 and the international decisions above, it is at 
least possible to argue that this is sufficient to constitute a customary right to remedial 
secession.  
2.5 Content of a right to remedial secession 
Concluding, remedial secession clearly has weak support from any formal sources,
63
 and 
there have been few, if any, examples of successful secessions outside the colonial context. 
On the other hand, most theorists, supported by a selected few documents of international 
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and national law, have persistently argued that such a right does in fact exist. In addition, 
states have proved unable or unwilling to declare remedial secession illegal per se.  
On this basis, the legal existence of such a right at this point in time can perhaps only be 
described as uncertain. Independent of such considerations, the following Chapter 3 
assumes that such a right existed. This raises the question of which criteria must be 
satisfied for a people to have this right. Based on the previous sections, the main criteria 
seem to be a people's prolonged denial of a right to “freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”64 The violation of 
other human rights is not a prerequisite for a right to remedial secession to exist, but it may 
exacerbate the situation and perhaps decrease the amount of time that must have passed for 
a right to materialise. Finally, as outlined in the Åland report, remedial secession is only 
legal as a last resort, when no other ways of resolving the problem can be found.  
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3 A right to remedial secession for the People of Kosovo? 
3.1 Short history of Kosovo 
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Weller's book Contested 
Statehood. 
After World War One, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was 
established. Serbia was made one of six constituent republics, and Kosovo was considered 
a region of Serbia. After having enjoyed significant autonomy under the 1974 Serbian 
Constitution, amendments limiting the autonomy of Kosovo were prepared by the 
Milosevic government of Serbia in 1989. Following Kosovo protests, Serbian armed forces 
entered Kosovo and lined up around the parliamentary building as the amendments were 
being debated inside. The Assembly was thereby pressured into accepting the amendments, 
although not by the 2/3 majority that the Constitution required. Nevertheless, the 
amendments were considered accepted.  
In 1990 the Serb authorities closed down the Kosovo Assembly altogether, and in the early 
and mid-1990s the authorities continuously took measures to diminish the powers and 
capabilities of Kosovo. In 1995, the General Assembly took note of the UNCHR Special 
Rapporteur having reported 
a) Police brutality against ethnic Albanians 
b) Discriminatory and arbitrary dismissals of ethnic Albanian civil servants... 
... 
e) The dismissals from clinics and hospitals of doctors and members of other 
categories of the medical profession of Albanian origin 
f) The elimination in practice of the Albanian language, particularly in public 
administration and services 
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g) The serious and massive occurrence of discriminatory and repressive practices 
aimed at Albanians in Kosovo, as a whole, resulting in widespread involuntary 
migration.
65
 
After initial non-violent protests, by 1996 the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
meant that violent resistance gained the upper hand. Negotiations by third parties were 
unsuccessful, and in March 1999 NATO decided to initiate bombing attacks to stop the 
grave human rights violations. 
At the same time as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was preparing 
indictments against Serbian leaders, the UN prepared and passed Security Council 
Resolution 1244. This provided for an interim administration for Kosovo, removing all 
Serbian influence. The document also envisaged a final status process after the situation 
had stabilized, although the details of such a process were not outlined. 
While the two entities were functioning isolated from each other, continuous efforts were 
made to negotiate a settlement. Serbia could however not agree to Kosovo independence, 
and Kosovo could not accept remaining under Serbian authority. In 2006 Serbia also 
passed a new Constitution, continuing to define Kosovo as a province of Serbia. In 2007 
the Secretary General's Special Envoy to Kosovo concluded that “no amount of additional 
talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse,” and recommended that “Kosovo's 
status should be independence, supervised by the international community.”66 
A draft resolution with this content was proposed but ultimately not passed by the Security 
Council. Instead, a last round of negotiations with senior officials from Russia, the EU and 
the USA was conducted, but after four months this Troika in December 2007 also had to 
concede that 
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the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither 
party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty 
over Kosovo.
67
  
Following this, the Assembly of Kosovo declared their independence. As of today, 66 
states plus the Republic of China (Taiwan) have recognized Kosovo as an independent 
state. Kosovo is also a member of the World Bank Institutions, 105 states voting for their 
membership. 
3.2 A right to remedial secession in 1999? 
Based on the definition given point 2.2.3, it may seem clear that Serbia in the 1990s 
violated the people of Kosovo's right to internal self-determination. 
However, looking at the developments at the time, one may get a different impression. As 
one author notes, “[i]t is noticeable that neither the Security Council nor the NATO states 
… referred to the right to self-determination … in Kosovo.”68 Instead, throughout the 
1990s, the international community repeatedly reaffirmed the territorial integrity of 
FRY/Serbia. The Badinter Commission, whose task it was to ensure the ordered breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the fundamental rights of all affected peoples', did not consider the 
question of Kosovo independence.
69
 The preamble of Resolution 1244 also referred 
explicitly to the territorial integrity of Serbia.  
Neither did international legal theory before 2008 argue in favour of Kosovo independence. 
Georg Nolte in 2006 grouped Kosovo together with other cases where “the Security 
Council has insisted on a political solution on the basis of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the State concerned.”70 Crawford similarly held that “Kosovo's legal position 
remains that of an autonomous area under international administration: the territorial 
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integrity of Serbia and Montenegro has so far been preserved and Kosovo is not (or not yet) 
a State.”71 
One may therefore be tempted to conclude that the people of Kosovo was not found to have 
a right to remedial secession in 1999. However, as the latest quote by Crawford hints at, 
this cannot be accepted. In 1999 there had been no attempts to resolve the situation by 
means other than remedial secession. The requirement of last resort was therefore not 
satisfied. Instead, the international community attempted to restore respect for self-
determination while still respecting FRY's territorial integrity.  
Based on the account in chapter 3.1 there can ultimately be no doubt that the denial of a 
right to self-determination, accompanied by violations of other human rights in Kosovo, 
satisfied the requirements of a right to remedial secession. However, at this point in time, 
the requirement of last resort prevented the international community from advocating 
secession. 
3.3 A right to remedial secession in February 2008? 
On February 17 the elected officials of Kosovo issued a declaration of independence, 
thereby attempting to secede from Serbia. The question is whether the people of Kosovo at 
that point satisfied the requirements for a right to remedial secession. 
3.3.1 The 1990s violations as justification for secession 
A first set of arguments in favour of Kosovo's independence maintain the 1990s atrocities 
as the basis for a right to secession in 2008. According to this view, the international 
community had by 2008 attempted to solve the situation through other means, without 
success. When Special Envoy Ahtisaari concluded that a negotiated settlement could not be 
reached, secession emerged as the last resort required by international law. 
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A first counter-argument would be that the time and effort spent trying to find another 
remedy was not sufficient. Taking an example from the proceedings, Cyprus argued that  
the time given to explore such options by Special Envoy Ahtisaari was very short 
and could not be said to give rise to a claim for any action as a 'last resort
72
  
Serbia further pointed to the very process before the ICJ as an alternative remedy, in itself 
meaning that the requirement of last resort was not satisfied.
73
  
This argument is not convincing. Firstly, the international community attempted to 
facilitate another solution for almost 10 years. Various formats of negotiations were 
attempted, even after the Special Envoy had concluded that such talks were futile. As for 
the procedure before the ICJ, this was clearly not a remedy for Kosovo. As a non-state 
entity, Kosovo could not bring the case before the ICJ, and as an advisory opinion the 
Court could under no circumstances decide the case under international law.  
A stronger counter-argument is that the violations that had taken place in the 1990s 
undeniably had ended by 2008.
74
 In fact, from 1999 until the time of the Declaration, 
Kosovo was under international administration. Serbia therefore had no influence on 
developments in Kosovo. As Kosovo's right to self-determination was not violated by 
Serbia at this time, the requirement for a right to remedial secession could be argued not to 
exist.  
Before the Court, this argument was strongly opposed by Kosovo's supporters, arguing that 
the fact that 
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... the Kosovars agreed to try to arrive at a consensual solution cannot now serve as 
the basis for the argument that during this time the Kosovars have lost their right of 
external self-determination...
75
 
In my view, the premise for this quote is not convincing. This becomes evident if we recall 
the fundamental rule as outlined in 2.1.3 above: territorial integrity is to be maintained 
unless the state does not respect the people's right to internal self-determination, and the 
situation cannot be remedied through other means.  
This means that a fundamental purpose behind this rule is to maintain territorial integrity if 
at all possible. The purpose is not to find a solution that both parties can agree to, or the 
best solution all things considered. Such a principle would place the seceding entity on 
equal terms with the parent state even before secession, contrary to the principle of states as 
the primary actors with jurisdiction over all internal matters as long as they respect 
fundamental human rights.  
From this it follows that the right to remedial secession will no longer exist if the other 
remedy has been good enough so as to re-establish a satisfactory degree of internal self-
determination. The conclusion of Special Envoy Ahtisaari that independence must be 
granted as “[a] return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo”76 is therefore no legal justification for a 
right to remedial secession. In addition, such a position is also problematic as it would give 
the seceding entity no incentive to participate in negotiations in good faith, as a breakdown 
in the negotiations would automatically grant them a right to secession.  
The argument that the human rights violations of the 1990s justified a right to remedial 
secession in 2008 can therefore not be accepted. If the rights of the people of Kosovo were 
respected at the time of the declaration, it does not matter that the Kosovars would prefer to 
have their own state. Serbia does not need the consent of Kosovo to maintain sovereignty 
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over it, as long as it respects the Kosovars right to internal self-determination. As was 
stated both in the Åland report and by CERD, there is no general right to secession merely 
because of a desire to do so.  
3.3.2 The situation in 2008 as basis for remedial secession 
Serbia is today a very different state than in the 1990s. The violations of fundamental 
human rights have ceased, and Serbia is a democratic state with an aspiration to join the 
European Union. Serbia has also shown willingness to cooperate to rectify past wrongs, 
illustrated by the handovers of former leaders Karadzic and Milosevic to the ICTY, and the 
Serbian Parliament's recent condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre.
77
 Another element 
illustrating this is the 2006 Serbian Constitution, who according to the independent Venice 
Commission 
shows that human rights form an integral and an important part of constitutional law 
and it makes it clear that attention is paid to this element and basic feature of a 
democratic society...
78
 
However, a straightforward conclusion that a right to remedial secession did not exist in 
2008 can be met with counter-arguments. Firstly, a new constitution is in itself no 
guarantee that such violations will not happen again. On the other hand, it is perhaps 
difficult to see that Serbia could do more in the current environment, as their separation 
from Kosovo gives no opportunity to prove their intentions in practice. 
More problematically, the new constitution “does not at all guarantee substantial autonomy 
of Kosovo,” this instead being entirely dependent “on the willingness of the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia...”79 Further, Serbia reportedly did not make any 
efforts to include the people of Kosovo in the development of the constitution, nor to 
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register them as voters. As a result, only 90 000 people in Kosovo were able to cast their 
vote.
80
 That this was a violation of the right to self-determination was however strongly 
contested by Serbia, arguing that Kosovars who had registered for voting did in fact have 
the chance to vote at ballot stations in Kosovo where “security and other legal requirements 
for voting were met.”81  
Thirdly, one may point to the reluctance of Serbia to admit the severity of the 1990s 
violations. Many have claimed that they attempted to downplay the grave human rights 
violations of the 1990s before the Court,
82
 and in the recent vote the Parliament of Serbia 
refused to label the Srebrenica massacre as genocide.
83
 If Serbia cannot accept the 
horrifying nature of their past policies, their guarantees to act according to human rights in 
the future suddenly do not seem as significant. 
3.4 Conclusion 
With these factors in mind it must be decided whether Kosovo had a right to remedial 
secession in 2008. On the one hand, Serbia is today a stable democratic state. The regime 
of the 1990s is gone, and a new constitution guaranteeing fundamental human rights is in 
place. On the other hand, this constitution does not guarantee the self-determination of 
Kosovo, and Serbia has arguably shown unwillingness to recognise the past. Neither of 
these factors does however mean that Serbia does not mean to respect Kosovo's rights in 
the future.  
In my view, if we attempt to picture history without past atrocities, these shortcomings 
would not be significant enough to give Kosovo a right to remedial secession. The 
underlying question is therefore whether past violations give Serbia a stricter obligation 
and burden of proof as regards the people of Kosovo. It is difficult to find a legal 
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justification for such a position. At the same time, it seems inherently reasonable that 
Serbia has to somehow earn the trust of the international community, and prove that they 
can respect the rights of Kosovo. Past events surely give both Kosovo and the international 
community reasons to be sceptical. 
Although past violations may strengthen the burden of proof for their good faith, it is on the 
other hand easy to understand Serbia's feeling that giving Kosovo the right to secede would 
be a punishment for their past wrongs rather than a remedy for the Kosovars. In my view, 
the most likely conclusion is therefore that the people of Kosovo did not have a legal right 
to remedial secession in 2008. Only by attaching significant emphasis on the events of the 
1990s can one argue that the uncertainty of Serbia's intentions is sufficient to set the 
principle of territorial integrity aside. If the conclusion in 3.3.2 is to have any meaning, one 
must however assess Serbia primarily on the situation as it stands in 2008, without looking 
too much into the past.  
3.5 Consequences for Kosovo  
From a legal perspective, Kosovo should therefore not be allowed to secede. On the other 
hand 66 states, including the majority of EU-states and the United States of America, have 
recognized Kosovo, and it has been accepted as a member of international organizations 
such as the World Bank. Notably, the ICJ also invited Kosovo to participate in the 
proceedings before the Court.
84
 
Kosovo is therefore already quite far along the path towards independence. Sterio believes 
that this process is irreversible, and uses Kosovo to argue her claim that the primary 
determinant for whether an attempted secession will be successful is not legal entitlement, 
but the support of what she calls the “Great Powers.”85 Attempting a more legal 
justification for acknowledging Kosovo independence, an insistence on Kosovo's 
reintroduction under Serbian rule would according to Special Envoy Ahtisaari provoke 
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“violent opposition” in Kosovo.86 With the region's violent history this would arguably run 
counter to the overall goal of achieving peace and stability in the region, and to the 
international peace and security that the UN system is meant to protect. 
The independence of Kosovo is in my view therefore very likely, although by no means 
certain. If such a development takes place however, it would not be due to a legal right. As 
the Supreme Court of Canada noted however, “a distinction must be drawn between the 
right of a people to act, and their power to do so.”87 As was touched upon in section 2.2, the 
formation of states is sometimes more a question of efficiency and political considerations 
rather than due to any legal entitlement.  
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4 After Kosovo 
4.1 Introduction 
So far we have seen that that the question of whether there existed a right to remedial 
secession in 2008 was unclear, and that even if such a right existed it is doubtful whether 
the people of Kosovo fulfilled the requirements. The question is now what the case of 
Kosovo will mean for international law. More specifically, we ask whether this case means 
that a customary right to remedial secession has now definitely emerged. We begin with 
some details about the proceedings, and some theoretical remarks about customary 
international law.  
4.2 Arguments before the Court  
4.2.1 Arguments in favour of a right to remedial secession 
The first thing to note about the arguments presented in favour of a right to remedial 
secession before the Court is that they are not new. Instead, states based their claim largely 
on the same arguments that international theorists have previously been using.  
Secondly, it is noteworthy how little space the proponents of such a right devoted to this 
question in their submissions to the Court. This can however probably be explained by the 
fact that making this argument was not necessary in order to support the independence of 
Kosovo. A significant number of states supporting Kosovo did therefore not even address 
the question of remedial secession.  
The following presentation is therefore brief, both because the arguments before the Court 
were brief, and because the main arguments in favour of a right to remedial secession were 
presented in chapter 2 above.  
The Friendly Relations Declaration of Resolution 2625, and later articulations of the same 
principle, remains the primary source that states relied on in the proceedings. Statements 
such as  
 39 
[s]upport for the existence of a right to external self-determination – outside the 
context of non-self governing territories, foreign occupation and consensual 
agreement – can be found, albeit a contrario, in Resolution 262588  
can be found in the submissions of most of the states arguing in favour of remedial 
secession. 
As regards the other arguments, they were to various degrees touched upon by the different 
delegations. The Åland-case was for example utilized by the delegation from Switzerland 
to argue that 
[i]n ... extreme situations, the right of a people to separate itself from a State ... has 
to be defined as an ultima ratio solution.
89
 
On the Supreme Court of Canada, Ireland declared that they agreed  
with the view expressed by the Canadian Supreme Court that ... [self- determination 
should be exercised internally but that] 'where this is not possible, in the exceptional 
circumstances discussed below, a right of secession may arise.'
90
 
States also to a significant degree referred to the writings of various international legal 
scholars. In particular, Crawford's book The Creation of States in International Law from 
2006 was used by a large number of delegations. Interestingly, the book was used by both 
sides in the proceedings. For example, Cyprus, arguing against a right to remedial 
secession, quoted this book as evidence of the “extreme reluctance of states to recognize or 
accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context.”91 However, Crawford himself 
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appearing before the Court as counsel for the United Kingdom, explained that his book had 
“humbly put forward the opinion that a right to remedial secession is emerging.”92  
A final argument, that I have not come across in my readings of earlier theory but that was 
relied on by certain delegations before the Court,
93
 is based on the illusionary character of 
any right of self-determination if it does not have an external component. The argument is 
that without a right to secession when internal self-determination is denied, this right itself 
becomes illusionary. Without a right to secede, the “people” is left at the mercy of the 
parent state, and no remedy is available to them if their rights are not respected.  
Looking at these arguments in general, a few things are notable. Firstly, all the sources 
states get their arguments from are regarded as secondary or not even mentioned in the ICJ 
statutes article 38. This illustrates that the hierarchy of sources is not as strict as article 38 
seems to imply. In addition, as will be argued in section 4.5.2 below, it may also signify 
that such arguments take on a higher significance when used in state argumentation, 
through states providing interpretations of their content. 
Secondly, it is notable which arguments states did not use. Most significantly, very few 
states referred to the secession of Bangladesh, and no state referred to the fact, as was 
explained in chapter 2 above, that secessionist attempts have never been declared illegal 
per se.  
This suggests one of two things. Either, states do not consider Bangladesh a case of 
remedial secession, and do not hold the lack of outright rejection of secessionist 
movements as significant. In my view, particularly the latter part of this argument is 
difficult to understand, the case for its significance having been laid out above. It should 
however be noted that this is an argument that I have neither come across in previous 
international legal theory.  
                                                 
92
 UK OP p.54 
93
 Germany WS p.34 
 41 
Alternatively, one may be inclined to think that while these states hold a right to remedial 
secession to exist as a last resort, they do not want to extend this right to a large group of 
such peoples, or encourage groups to seek secession. Setting the case of Kosovo in direct 
connection with previous secessionist movements would arguably create the impression 
that such a right is easily accessible. Instead, by arguing that only Kosovo as a special case 
fulfil these strict requirements,
94
 one hopes to discourage other peoples to follow the same 
path unless extreme circumstances require such a solution.  
4.2.2 Arguments against a right to remedial secession 
The eleven states arguing against a right to remedial secession generally spent more time 
arguing this point than those in favour of such a right. This must be explained by the fact 
that whereas “Kosovo need not be an exercise of the right to external self-determination to 
be consistent with international law,”95 the Court would “need to decide it before [they] 
could answer the question in the negative, against Kosovo.”96 In contrast to states 
supporting Kosovo independence, it was therefore necessary for opponents to disprove the 
existence of a right to remedial secession, or at least disprove that Kosovo fulfilled the 
requirements for such a right.  
Materially, these states made their case by attacking the various sources relied on by the 
states in support of such a right. They firstly employed the argument presented in chapter 
2.4.6 above concerning the weakness of previous sources, but in addition they also to 
varying extent specifically criticized each source. 
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The Friendly Relations Declaration 
Some states argued in the proceedings that Resolution 2625 was meant only to address the 
process of decolonization.
97
 This argument is of little value however, as the same phrase 
has been repeated in later documents such as paragraph 2 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration. 
Secondly, opponents pointed to the drafting history of paragraph 7. According to for 
example Serbia, this clause was inserted at the request of Italy so as to emphasize the 
respect for territorial integrity of states.
98
 It was therefore never the intention of the drafters 
that this resolution should be read “backwards,” so as to give a right to secession if states 
did not respect the right to self-determination of its peoples.  
This argument raises questions of treaty interpretation. According to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties article 31, reflecting customary international law,
99
 
treaties are to be interpreted  
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
The emphasis on “ordinary meaning” means that primary emphasis is to be put on the 
textual content of the provisions.
100
 A main reason for this is that states spend a significant 
amount of time negotiating a text that all states can agree on, every word being deliberate. 
Although not strictly a treaty, this must clearly also hold true for documents such as 
General Assembly resolutions. In this case, the text of the treaty being so clear, an 
interpretation contrary to the textual meaning would at least have required states holding 
such a view to make this clear immediately. This was never done. Instead the same text has 
been repeated in later documents.  
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Finally, opponents argued that if a General Assembly resolution were to contain such an 
important principle, it cannot be based on a mere a contrario reading of the terms of the 
Declaration, but would have to be articulated clearly.
101
 Again however, one must 
emphasize that such an interpretation naturally follows from the reading of the text itself. 
Further, it is well known that resolutions of the UN are often couched in very vague and 
diplomatic terms so as to gather the support of the required number of states.  
Re. Secession of Quebec 
In addition to questioning the significance that can be attached to the decision of a domestic 
court, the opposing states focused on the content of the Supreme Court's verdict. They 
rightly point to that the Canadian Court did not find that such a right definitely existed.
102
 
Instead, it found that it “remains unclear whether this proposition actually reflects and 
established international law standard.”103  
This argument is clearly correct, and perhaps for this reason quite a few pro-states 
emphasized that the case is primarily helpful in determining the content of such a right, 
suggesting that violation of other human rights than self-determination is not required for a 
right to external self-determination to emerge.
104
  
Serbia in their written statements also briefly turned to the only other domestic Court that 
has discussed the question of remedial secession, the Russian Constitutional Court.
105
 
Addressing the question of Chechnyan independence, this Court according to Serbia 
concluded against such a right existing, arguing that  
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any unilateral action aimed at breaking up the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of the Russian Federation would not be in conformity with international 
rules governing human rights and the rights of people.
106
 
Without going into detail as regards this case, this clearly carries the same concerns 
regarding significance as the opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court.  
On the lack of state practice 
Perhaps most significantly, states opposing a right to remedial secession argued that there 
does not exist any state practice in favour of a right to external self-determination. As for 
example Argentina argued,  
The so-called theory of “remedial secession” is nothing more than an argument 
made in doctrine, and which has not received any legal consecration.
107
  
Again it is notable that few pro-states argued explicitly against this point, by pointing to 
Bangladesh or that earlier rejections of secessions have happened on a case by case basis.  
Potential destabilisation 
States arguing against a right to remedial secession also argued that such a right will have 
destabilising effects on the international system. Cyprus for example claimed that “[t]he 
weakening of the protection of the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention 
could hardly be avoided.”108 Arguably however, this will not happen as long as the criteria 
for achieving such a right remain strict. The delegation from Germany in my view rightly 
argued that 
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[r]emedial secession would not endanger international stability, as it would only 
come into play under circumstances where the situation inside a State has 
deteriorated to a point where it might be considered to endanger international peace 
and security.
109
 
On the “illusionary” right of self-determination 
This argument was not explicitly countered by the states arguing against a right to remedial 
secession. Counter-arguments can nevertheless be made. Most significantly, as seen, many 
United Nations documents support the right to self-determination. This organisation 
therefore also has a responsibility to protect this right.  
Even if were to argue that the Security Council can only act when there are threats to 
“international peace and security,”110 and that denial of self-determination does not fulfil 
this requirement, the UN Human Rights Council and other bodies have mechanisms for 
addressing such problems. That these mechanisms arguably are weak cannot legally justify 
allowing people to act on their own. It is also clearly undesirable to have rules of 
international law encouraging peoples to take matters into their own hands. Neither can the 
argument that a right to remedial secession is necessary to provide “a remedy beyond 
corrective instruments once the evil is done,”111 justify this, as a denial of internal self-
determination will rarely require the type of urgent response that such an argument 
presupposes. 
On this basis, the conclusion of the opposing states was well captured by the delegation of 
Cyprus, arguing that 
[w]hile the claim that there is a 'right to secession of last resort' has been supported 
by some writers and by a contrario reasoning ... it is without support in State 
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practice. It has not emerged as a rule of customary law. It is not found in any treaty. 
And it has no support from the practice of the UN.
112
 
4.2.3 Kosovo as sui generis 
For the complete picture of state arguments before the Court, it is necessary also to present 
the sui generis character of Kosovo emphasized by a large number of states. 
The factors giving Kosovo such status seems to vary slightly from delegation to delegation, 
but the core of the argument was many of the same points as have previously been 
addressed in different contexts: The human rights violations of the 1990s, the resentment 
that this created in Kosovo against Serbian rule, and the interim arrangements that 
separated Kosovo from Serbia for almost 10 years.
113
 
For the opponents of a right to secession, the sui generis argument had a subsidiary 
character, limiting the precedence in case the Court would find Kosovo's secession in 
accordance with international law. For the supporters of Kosovo, states may be put in two 
different groups. Some states, such as France and the USA, avoided the question of 
remedial secession by basing their argument for Kosovo independence on sui generis 
arguments alone. France for example in this way argued that 
Kosovo was placed under international administration for nearly nine years, 
resulting de facto in an irreversible situation
114
 
and later that 
[t]he brutal repression – and the international crimes accompanying it – to which 
the Kosovar population was subject to in 1998-9 could but prevent it from 
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contemplating a future within the Serbian state... There are crimes which cannot 
fade from the individual and collective memory.
115
 
According to this view the international community is presented to a fait accompli, 
secession being the unavoidable result of Kosovo's unique situation. Several states in this 
connection also quote Special Envoy Ahtisaari's final report to the Security Council:  
Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a 
precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 
(1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by 
denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United 
Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances 
extraordinary.
116
 
This is of course a tempting argument for states, allowing them so support Kosovo without 
opening the Pandora's Box of giving a right to secession for other suppressed peoples 
around the world. It is however an argument that is very difficult to contest or evaluate 
under international law. By arguing that this “unique case … demands a unique solution,” 
the justification for secession is in a certain sense taken outside the framework of 
international law itself. Any argument that there does not exist such a right becomes 
remote, as the world has never before faced such a situation.  
If international law is to have any meaning however, actions must be justified within the 
existing framework. Underlining the special status may limit the consequences that Kosovo 
may have on the right to secession under international law, but cannot exist as an 
independent legal justification of a right to remedial secession.  
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Also a number of the states in favour of a right to remedial secession emphasized the 
special status of Kosovo. This must again be explained by the fact that even states arguing 
for a right to remedial secession do not want this right to be available in all but the fewest 
of cases. By arguing that Kosovo as sui generis are the only people currently satisfying the 
requirements, the criteria are indeed kept narrow. In contrast to the other groups of states 
however, the sui generis argument here only addressed the question of when, not if, 
remedial secession is legal. 
4.3 On Customary international law 
The arguments before the Court were not new. The possible impact that the case of Kosovo 
will have on international law is therefore not in the arguments made, but instead in the fact 
that these arguments were made. For the first time a number of states openly argued that 
there exists a right to remedial secession. The question is whether this, together with the 
recognition of Kosovo by various states, may have contributed to a right to remedial 
secession as part of customary international law.  
4.3.1 Introduction 
We recall the definition in the ICJ Statutes article 38 (1) (b) of international customary law 
as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”117 We further recall the basic 
definitions of state practice and opinio juris,
118
 who must both be present for a customary 
international law to emerge. While this contained the essentials of a definition, there are 
several debates concerning the nature and requirements of customary international law. 
These debates are presented in this chapter 4.3, and the conclusions will then be used in the 
analysis in 4.4 and 4.5. 
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4.3.2 State practice 
The first question is what exactly may constitute state practice. On the one hand, one may 
argue that state practice it limited to what states do, and therefore do not include what states 
say. For example, Judge Read in his dissenting opinion in the Fisheries case argued that it 
could not constitute state practice where states 
have made extensive claims, but have not maintained their claims by the actual 
assertion of sovereignty.
119
  
In later judgements the Court has however come to a different conclusion. According to 
Malanczuk, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case the majority judgement clearly treated claims 
as state practice, “without considering whether they had been enforced.”120 
The view that state practice only includes what states do can also be more generally 
criticized. Firstly, it would mean that in certain areas of law only the most powerful states 
can contribute to the emergence of custom.
121
 Secondly, it may encourage states to act even 
if they do not desire to do so. If a state wants to contribute to a customary international law 
prohibiting torture, can one really say that official condemnation of torture is not state 
practice unless the state engages in physical acts against the perpetrators?  
That claims constitute state practice is also supported by the majority of international legal 
theory. Müllerson notes that “at least in inter-state relations, saying is also doing.”122 Shaw 
finds that 
[c]laims and conventions of states in various contexts have been adduced as 
evidence of state practice and it is logical that this should be so...
123
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Akehurst, in a phrase often quoted with approval, writes that  
... state practice covers any act or statements by a state from which views about 
customary law may be inferred.
124
 
On this basis it seems clear that both acts of recognition and non-recognition, as well as 
statements made before the Court, satisfies the criteria of state practice.  
4.3.3 State practice vs. opinio juris 
The debate in the previous section may however be of little more than academic interest in 
the current context, as we turn to the question of the relative significance of state practice 
and opinio juris in the formation of international customary law. 
Traditional legal theory has focused primarily on state practice as the determinant of 
customary international law. The creation of customary law has been seen as an inductive 
process, where one through observing states over time may see established patterns of 
behaviour. Opinio juris is then invoked to distinguish between on the one hand behaviour 
that is carried out due to a belief that it constitutes the law, and on the other hand acts that 
are carried out due to tradition, practicalities or other reasons.
125
 
Positivists, and the realist tradition that has featured prominent in international theory in the 
last decades, see this somewhat differently. This theoretical position, that has significantly 
influenced international law and politics, puts primary emphasis on state sovereignty. Of 
paramount importance is therefore the principle that states are only bound by what they 
have consciously consented to.
126
 The psychological element of opinio juris therefore 
becomes the most importance factor in the creation of customary law. As long as states 
have expressed a belief that they are bound by a customary law, it matters less whether they 
have shown state practice to this effect.  
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There has therefore been a tendency in international law to shift focus from state practice 
towards opinio juris in the determination of customary international law. This is 
particularly so as regards human rights norms. This is because the perceived normative 
value of such norms has led to an increasing push towards establishing customary norms 
protecting such rights, even if state practice is lacking. In other words, because such norms 
are seen as desirable, customary norms are understood to exist as long as states express that 
they believe such rules to exist. As Roberts writes,  
[t]he moral content of modern custom explains the strong tendency to discount the 
importance of state practice in the modern approach. Substantive morality of some 
customs outweighs defects in their process.
127
 
Kirgis has described this relationship between state practice and opinio juris as a sliding 
scale,
128
 where they together have to reach a certain threshold for a customary law to be 
established. Deficiencies in one of the categories can be compensated by strong evidence of 
the other. To take torture as an example, many states clearly do not act in accordance with a 
prohibition on torture. However, few if any state would argue that torture is legal. Because 
the act of torture is viewed as morally indefensible, and because states will not seek to 
justify general acts of torture, a customary ban on torture is nevertheless undoubtedly 
perceived to exist.  
4.3.4 Uniformity and duration 
In the Asylum case, the ICJ held that a customary rule must be “in accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question.”129 This indicates a high 
threshold both as regards time and uniformity in order to establish customary international 
law.  
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However, it seems to be generally accepted that duration is not the most importance factor 
when establishing customary norms. As the example of international space law clearly 
illustrated, customary law can arguably appear almost instantaneously if there are no strong 
contrary norms already existing, and the opinio juris of states is strong and clear.
130
 
As regards uniformity, the judgement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case shows that not 
absolute conformity in practice and opinio juris is required for a customary rule to exist. 
There the Court held that 
[i]n order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient 
that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules…131 
As for example Malanczuk notes,  
general practice does not require the unanimous practice of all states or other 
international subjects. This means that a state can be bound by the general practice 
of other states even against its wishes …132 
Such a view is also implicit in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in the Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons case, where he noted that the states acting contrary to a proposed 
customary ban on nuclear weapons was  
not a practice of a lone and secondary persistent objector … [but] the practice of 
five of the world's major Powers, of the permanent Members of the Security 
Council, significantly supported … by their allies and other States …133 
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This shows that a customary norm cannot emerge if the major powers act contrary to such a 
norm. On the other hand, Judge Schwebel implies that if only a few, and perhaps less 
significant states object, the norm will nevertheless emerge.  
In addition, also as regards uniformity does it seem that less is required to form strongly 
normative customary laws. Again using the words of Roberts,  
[t]he international community discounts the importance of dissenting states and 
contrary state practice because it is not prepared to recognize exceptions to the 
maintenance of certain fundamental values.
134
 
Again using torture as an example, the significant amount of states undoubtedly conducting 
acts of torture does not weaken the perception that torture is illegal under international 
customary law. 
4.3.5 Abstentions as state practice 
Another question is the significance of abstentions in the emergence of international law. 
More specifically the question concerns situations where State A engages in an activity that 
State B does not protest against. Can B be said to have accepted the formation of a 
customary rule in accordance with how A acted?  
The traditional case on this topic is the Lotus case before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in 1928, who held that abstentions can only fulfil the requirement of 
opinio juris “if such abstentions were based on [the states] being conscious of a duty to 
abstain.”135 The situation was here arguably slightly different however, as the question 
concerned a possible customary obligation to abstain. 
Of greater relevance is perhaps the judgment in the Gulf of Maine case. The ICJ here found 
that abstentions could indeed contribute to customary international law, using the term 
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“acquiescence” and describing it as the “equivalent to tacit recognition, manifested by 
unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent.”136  
Based on this, it seems reasonable to claim that if a group of states act in a certain way in 
the belief that this is the law, the failure of other states to protest may constitute accept of 
this law if they could be expected to protest in the prevailing circumstances. Using the 
example from above, this must particularly be so if it is clear for State B that State A is 
acting out of a belief that their actions constitute the law, or even more so if State A is 
actively trying to establish a rule of customary law.  
That such acquiescence constitutes state practice and opinio juris accepting the formation 
of customary international law is also argued in legal theory. Shaw writes that “[g]enerally, 
where states are seen to acquiesce in the behaviour of other states, without protesting 
against them, the assumption must be that such behaviour is accepted as legitimate.”137 
Mendelson writes that “if a state actually does acquiesce in a practice, this is equivalent to 
consent and will be sufficient to bind it.”138  
4.3.6 Kosovo's own arguments 
As Kosovo is not a state, it is notable that the Court nevertheless invited Kosovo “to make 
written contributions to the Court,”139 and later also decided to let Kosovo participate in the 
oral proceedings. This contrasts to the decision in the South West Africa case, where South 
West Africa was not allowed to participate.  
Firstly, this may in itself be an indication that the Court at least attaches some “state-like” 
characteristics to this entity. The question here is however what weight may be attached to 
their arguments before the Court. One the one hand, the arguments can clearly not 
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constitute state practice. On the other hand, the Court has viewed Kosovo's arguments as 
relevant, treating them as equal participants in the proceedings.  
Although perhaps tempting, giving Kosovo's arguments equal standing as other statements 
neglects the fact that Kosovo is not a state, and not a UN member. It therefore seems 
correct not to view Kosovo's arguments as evidence of state practice and opinio juris, but as 
representing a form of judicial theory argued by the legal scholars representing Kosovo.  
4.4 Recognition of Kosovo independence 
4.4.1 States that have recognised Kosovo 
66 states have recognised Kosovo as an independent state. This act of recognition clearly 
falls within the definition of state practice. The same must be the case of voting for Kosovo 
becoming a member of the World Bank, which almost 40 additional states did.  
There is therefore significant state practice supporting Kosovo independence. The question 
is however whether these acts indicate a belief in a right to remedial secession. The act of 
recognition clearly suggests that states do not see it as illegal for Kosovo to secede. 
However, as has been touched on above, states may extend recognition for a variety of 
reasons, including reasons of efficiency. Without express statements to the contrary, it is 
arguably difficult to find in such recognition itself a belief that a right to remedial secession 
exists. 
The sui generis arguments presented in chapter 4.3.2 further suggests that not all states 
have recognised Kosovo due to a right to remedial secession. Notably, the Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence itself proclaimed that Kosovo independence was “not a 
precedent for any other situation.” This was clearly an attempt to convince states that they 
could recognise Kosovo without this having influence on general international law.  
Sui generis arguments was therefore one of two reasons why the International Fact-Finding 
Mission to Georgia found it “more than doubtful that a new rule of customary international 
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law has been created on the basis of the Kosovo case,”140 the other being that “precedents 
do not make new laws in themselves,” as there must be a general practice over a certain 
amount of time, accompanied by opinio juris.
141
 
Each of these claims can be contested however. As regards the second argument, we have 
already seen that customary law may be created in very short amounts of time if opinio 
juris is strong. If all states recognised Kosovo, at the same time expressing that this was 
due to a right to remedial secession, such a right could at least be argued to immediately 
have become customary international law. Further, the recognition of Kosovo does not 
happen in a previously empty field of law. As seen, there is already significant evidence of 
state practice and strong support from international law scholars arguing for the existence 
of such a rule. The recognition of Kosovo by a large number of states, and most likely a 
successful secession, therefore arguably only has to contribute a certain amount to 
complete the codification of this principle into customary international law.  
As regards sui generis-arguments, the label of sui generis itself is firstly open to debate. 
History has shown that neither serious human rights violations nor denial of internal self-
determination are unique circumstances. Even if one accepts that a case like Kosovo has 
not happened before, this does not mean that a similar situation may not arise in the future. 
Arguably, the apparent success of the Kosovo interim administration as the cornerstone of 
the sui generis claim has even made it more likely that similar arrangements will be 
attempted in the future. 
Further, sui generis arguments and a right to remedial secession for Kosovo are not 
mutually exclusive. This is illustrated by the significant amount of states making both these 
arguments. As noted, these states make the argument to limit the amount of peoples that 
will fulfil the criteria for a right to remedial secession. Sui generis arguments thereby 
arguably concerns just as much when a right to remedial secession exists, not if it exists.  
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4.4.2 States that have not recognised Kosovo 
While it may be questionable whether the recognition of Kosovo constitutes opinio juris 
support of a right to remedial secession, neither can an abstention from recognising Kosovo 
mean that states do not recognise a right to independence or a right to remedial secession. 
As the United Kingdom pointed out in their oral presentation,  
[i]n all likelihood, the vast majority of States that have not recognized Kosovo have 
no firm view on the matter, are hesitating in the face of the chilling effect of the 
present proceedings, or do not engage in formal practices of recognition.
142
 
In other words, the abstention from recognition does not in itself carry the necessary opinio 
juris component to contribute to the formation of customary international law. As the 
examples of Russia and Romania show, it is also clearly possible to support the existence 
of a right to remedial secession, but still argue that the people of Kosovo do not satisfy the 
requirements.
143
 
4.5 The arguments before the Court 
4.5.1 Do the arguments constitute opinio juris? 
Thirteen states plus Kosovo argued in favour of a right to remedial secession. The question 
is what significance this has for customary international law.  
According to the definition above, claims made by states constitute state practice. Even if 
this term is interpreted so narrowly that statements before the Court are not included 
however, strong evidence of opinio juris is arguably sufficient to create custom in 
normative areas of law. The right to self-determination clearly falls in this category.  
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Do the arguments before the Court constitute opinio juris? A counter-argument could be 
that states before the Court were motivated by various concerns other than strictly legal 
considerations. Spain and Cyprus for example, having their own internal secessionist 
movements, could clearly be thought to argue based on domestic rather than strictly legal 
concerns.  
While state practice may lack opinio juris however, opinio juris cannot itself lack opinio 
juris. When states explicitly argue their view of the law they must simply be believed on 
their word, states also knowing that their arguments may influence international law in the 
future. Opinio juris in this sense concerns statements of beliefs rather than actual beliefs.
144
 
In the words of Cassese and Weiler, 
when [states] make statements, they do not just speak for the sake of speaking; they 
should be taken seriously ... if they put forward a legal view concerning a certain 
type of conduct, this view should be taken seriously as expressing their legal 
opinion.
145
 
We therefore conclude that the arguments before the Court are expressions of opinio juris, 
and by most definitions also constitute state practice.  
4.5.2 States addressing remedial secession in the proceedings 
This section asks to what extent the states that addressed the question of remedial secession 
before the Court has influenced the existence of such a right. Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 then 
examines the significance of states that did not address the issue, or that did not participate 
in the proceedings.  
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The number of states 
The most obvious argument against the proceedings as a significant contributor to 
customary international law is the low number of states that supported a right to remedial 
secession before the Court. Clearly, thirteen states plus Kosovo does not even satisfy the 
lower benchmarks for morally strong customs. Further, as the ICJ held in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case, a customary law requires at the very least that the “states whose 
interests are specially affected”146 must have shown such state practice. Arguably, as 
regards remedial secession, those states that are most affected, having their own 
secessionist movements, are also the strongest opponents of such a right. 
Although the significance of this can hardly be denied, counter-arguments can be made. As 
regards the last point, arguing that some states are more affected is arguably misguided. As 
already noted, the right to self-determination is an obligation erga omnes.
147
 It is therefore 
legally speaking an equal concern of all states, no state being more affected than others. As 
to the more general point, fourteen delegations in favour of a right to remedial secession is 
arguably more significant than it seems, as it constitutes more than fifty percent of the 
delegations that addressed the question.  
Variation among states 
Among opponents of a right to remedial secession, the size, location and statute vary from 
China to Burundi. Among supporters on the other hand, only Jordan represented the non-
European world. This could indicate that the “normative value” that would decrease the 
requirements of state practice is not global, but regional. Regional state practice will also 
generally carry less weight under international law than if there was global support.  
Although this is again a good argument why the arguments of thirteen states can ultimately 
not make a customary law on its own, it can be contested. Firstly, one can argue that 
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regionalism is irrelevant in the context of erga omnes obligations, as such obligations are 
the equal responsibility of the entire international community. This does however not 
address the question of the interpretation or content of such rights, which can still clearly 
be motivated by regional concerns.  
The variation of states nevertheless arguably carries limited weight in the current context. 
This is not because all states have equal influence on the creation of customary law. Judge 
Schwebel's quote above clearly illustrates that this is not the case. As illustrated there 
however, states' impact on customary law primarily depends on the influence of the state, 
not its location. In this case, it cannot be convincingly argued that the states opposing a 
right to remedial secession are more powerful than its supporters. If anything, states in 
favour of a right to remedial secession arguably have more international clout, two 
permanent member of the UN Security Council supporting a right to remedial secession 
and only one opposing it. 
Secondly, closer examination also indicates that participating states have not been 
motivated by regional concerns. Instead, the primary trend is that states facing domestic 
secessionist movements argue against a right to remedial secession. The example of Europe 
illustrates this, Cyprus and Spain arguing against a right to remedial secession, presumably 
due to their respective conflicts with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the 
Basques. It therefore seems that the influencing factor is domestic rather than regional 
concerns.  
In fact, the domestic motivations of states may be an argument in favour of the emergence 
of a right to remedial secession. Although we concluded above that domestic 
considerations do not influence opinio juris, this would in any case only strengthen the 
emergence of a right to remedial secession. This is because states arguing against a right to 
remedial secession would be concerned with their own domestic peoples, while States in 
favour would be free of such domestic concerns. The argument would therefore arguably 
only diminish the value of the arguments presented by states opposing remedial secession, 
not those arguing in its favour.  
 61 
Influence on other sources 
Lastly, the arguments of states may not only contribute to the right to remedial secession 
directly as state practice and opinio juris. As seen above, states largely relied on traditional 
evidence when arguing in favour of a right to remedial secession. By citing these however, 
states offer their interpretation and express a belief that these documents support a right to 
remedial secession. These sources thereby gain legitimacy as sources of law, and 
strengthen the overall case for a right to remedial secession. Although clearly not having 
the same effect on these sources as Resolution 2625 had on the interpretation of the UN 
Charter,
148
 states have nevertheless offered important interpretations, and arguably elevated 
these sources to a higher status than before these proceedings.  
4.5.3 Other states before the Court 
Despite these arguments, the arguments of fourteen delegations are clearly not sufficient to 
establish a customary international law. We therefore turn to those states that participated 
in the proceedings, but did not address the question of remedial secession. These states 
favoured the independence of Kosovo by a margin of fourteen to five. 
On the one hand, these states did not support a right to remedial secession even if they had 
the opportunity. In my view however, the silence of these states must be seen as 
contributing to a right to remedial secession. 
This is based on the fact that Kosovo already, by the time of the proceedings, was 
recognised by a significant number of states, and arguably already well on its way to 
independence.
149
 Other states were naturally aware of this, and also saw that a significant 
number of states argued in favour of a right to remedial secession in their submissions to 
the Court. Nevertheless, these states abstained from arguing against a right to remedial 
secession. In my interpretation, if these states believed such a right not to exist, they would 
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be inclined to argue this point so as to avoid the consolidation of such a rule as part of 
international law.  
That they did not do so can be interpreted in two ways, but ultimately leading to the same 
result. Either, they believed such a right to exist and therefore found themselves not able to 
argue against it. This parallels previous examples where states did not reject secessionist 
movements outright.
150
 Alternatively, states believed, or wanted, such a right to exist, but 
found that the likely independence of Kosovo in combination with the arguments of 
fourteen delegations was sufficient to establish such a customary law. They therefore did 
not find it necessary themselves to address this arguably controversial point before the 
Court. The requirement that abstentions must be due to opinio juris is in both these cases 
satisfied.  
One could perhaps argue that the sui generis arguments presented by a number of states as 
an independent justification for secession is a rejection of the right to remedial secession. 
This can clearly not be so. No state arguing in favour of Kosovo as sui generis expressed 
any views contrary to a right to remedial secession. And as previously seen, also states 
arguing in favour of remedial secession highlighted Kosovo's sui generis status. Again, sui 
generis under this angle concerns the requirements for remedial secession, rather than a 
rejection of the existence of such a right.  
4.5.4 States not participating in the proceedings 
Similar considerations can be made as regards states that decided not to participate in the 
proceedings. Also these states saw the recognition of Kosovo by various states. If they did 
not believe Kosovo to have a right to secession, they would have to address the question in 
public. Instead, they abstained, leading to the conclusion that  
[a]part from those 15 to 20 states that have participated in these proceedings and 
have, for their own very particular reasons, declared their opposition to Kosovo's 
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independence, there is no evidence of widespread opposition to Kosovo's 
independence.
151
 
As regards the proceedings before the Court, one could perhaps argue that the question 
posed to the ICJ by the General Assembly did not address remedial secession directly. For 
this reason, states may not have been aware that this question would be addressed, or that 
arguments supporting this right would be made before the Court. Their abstention from 
arguing against a right to remedial secession would thereby not be due to any legal 
consideration. 
However, the written statements submitted to the Court were publicly available before the 
oral proceedings began. As the examples of Saudi Arabia and Jordan show, states were 
permitted to participate in the oral proceedings before the Court without having submitted 
written statements. Having seen that a significant number of states argued in favour of a 
right to remedial secession in their written submissions, states opposing such a right would 
therefore have the same incentive as participating states to argue against such a right. 
Nevertheless, they abstained from doing so.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Summing up the two previous sections, we may look at the question the other way around: 
only fifteen states out of a possible 192 opposed the attempted secession of Kosovo, a 
secession that quite clearly found its justification in the denial of self-determination 
imposed upon Kosovo in the 1990s. Before the Court, where all states had the opportunity 
to speak against a right to remedial secession, only eleven states found themselves able or 
willing to do so.  
Can this be enough to hinder a customary law from emerging? According to the criteria in 
section 4.3 above, and in particular in light of the strong normative nature of the right to 
self-determination, this can in my view not be so. If states opposed that such a right existed, 
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they would, in light of Kosovo's move towards independence and the arguments presented 
before the Court, have to argue against it. Lacking this, they acquiesced in the development 
of such a norm, fulfilling the requirement articulated in the Gulf of Maine case.  
4.7 Persistent objectors 
If we accept that a customary right to remedial secession exists, a question emerges 
concerning the states that opposed such a right before the Court. In the Fisheries case, the 
ICJ articulated the persistent objector principle, finding that  
in any event the ... rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway 
inasmuch as she had always opposed any attempt to apply it...
152
 
In general terms, the principle means that a customary law is not binding for states that 
have protested against it from its inception.
153
 From this premise, the Independent Mission 
to Georgia stated without reservation that states “denying Kosovo’s right to secede would 
have to be considered as persistent objectors” and thereby not bound by the rule.154 
This can however be questioned. Firstly, as seen in chapter 2, a right to remedial secession 
may have existed before 2008. In that case, a protest before the Court in 2009 could not 
make states persistent objectors. Even if this was not the case however, there were before 
this time strong advocates as well as state practice supporting such a view. Nevertheless, no 
state protested against such a right before in the current proceedings. One may therefore 
argue that even in such a scenario, states did not protest from the time when they first had a 
chance to do so, and have therefore consented to such a right. 
If one on the other hand finds that the inception of such a right happened in the proceedings 
before the Court, one must perhaps accept that eleven states become persistent objectors. 
This is however clearly an unsatisfying result, meaning that Serbia does not have to respect 
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Kosovo's legal right to independence. Some authors therefore suggest that states cannot be 
persistent objectors to customary norms of strong normative value.
155
 Going even further, 
some argue that such fundamental human rights norms cannot be seen as customary rules at 
all, and instead must be considered as general principles of international law within the 
meaning of the ICJ statutes Article 38 (1) (c).
156
 As we are running out of words however, a 
further exploration of this argument must lie outside the scope of this thesis.  
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5 Conclusions 
This thesis has argued two primary points. In Chapter 3 it was concluded that even if there 
existed a right to remedial secession in 2008, the people of Kosovo most likely did not 
fulfil the criteria for such a right when they declared independence in February 2008. In 
spite of this, a significant number of states have already recognised Kosovo, and it is 
perhaps difficult to see that the process towards independence can be reversed.  
Chapter 4 argued that if a right to remedial secession did not exist before 2008, the case of 
Kosovo, and in particular the proceedings before the ICJ, has contributed to such a right 
emerging as part of customary international law. Thirteen states' clear expressions of a 
belief in a right to remedial secession constitute state practice and opinio juris to this effect. 
In addition, their arguments also provide interpretations of previous international 
documents and legal theory supporting a right to remedial secession.  
The claim is nevertheless not that the arguments of thirteen states plus Kosovo are 
sufficient to create customary law. Despite being open to all however, only eleven states, 
and arguably for domestic reasons, argued against a right to remedial secession. Other 
states, aware of the arguments before the Court, and aware of Kosovo moving towards 
independence, nevertheless refrained from arguing against such a right. In abstaining from 
making such arguments, they acquiesced to such a customary law coming into existence.  
Secondly, the recognition by 66 states of Kosovo independence shows that states accept 
that secessions can take place without consent of the parent state. Although states may have 
attempted to limit the precedent of Kosovo through sui generis arguments, and one may 
argue that recognition is a matter of efficiency rather than legal right, their acceptance of 
Kosovo's independence and the denial of internal self-determination in the 1990s can 
hardly be denied. At the very least, Kosovo will therefore set a strong precedent, and give a 
strong argument, for other peoples being denied internal self-determination.  
Thirdly, the case of Kosovo has not emerged in a previously empty field of law. Rather, the 
arguments presented before the Court have come in addition to previous arguments made 
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by various theorists, as well as previous state practice. The required state practice to 
establish a right to remedial secession as part of customary law is therefore lower than 
would otherwise be the case.  
Lastly, the emergence of a right to remedial secession must be seen in the context of a 
greater development in recent decades. In this time we have seen an increasing focus on 
human rights and democracy, with correspondingly less focus on sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. A right to remedial secession is therefore only the latest development in this 
direction. This does however not necessarily mean that these ideas and ideals are new. A 
red line can indeed be drawn from remedial secession and all the way back to the ideas of 
Rousseau and the social contract, the sovereign only being permitted to rule as long as he 
respects the peoples' wishes. 
The criteria for achieving a right to remedial secession remain strict, the sui generis 
arguments before the Court clearly showing that the people of Kosovo are the only people 
currently having this right. That the criteria remain narrow is important, and territorial 
integrity must clearly be maintained as a fundamental principle so as to prevent chaos. The 
challenge of the future therefore remains to strike a balance between these fundamental 
principles. After the case of Kosovo however, international law will likely be able to leave 
behind the question of if there is a right to remedial secession, and focus all attention on the 
question of when.  
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7 Annex – States’ positions on Kosovo and remedial secession 
 
 
 
State
Supports 
Kosovo inde-
pendence?
Discusses 
remedial 
secession?
Right to remedial 
secession in 
international law?
If such a right, 
does it exist 
for Kosovo? Comments
Albania Yes Yes Yes Yes
Argentina No Yes No -
Austria Yes No - -
Azerbaijan No Yes No -
Belarus No Yes Yes No
Bolivia No Yes No -
Brazil No No - -
Bulgaria Yes No - -
Burundi Yes Yes No -
China No Yes No -
Croatia Yes No - -
Cyprus No Yes No -
Czech Republic Yes No - -
Denmark Yes No - -
Egypt Unclear No - -
Estonia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes
France Yes No - -
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ireland Yes Yes Yes Yes
Iran No Yes No -
Japan Yes No - -
Jordan Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kosovo Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latvia Yes No - -
Libya No No - -
Luxembourg Yes No - -  
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State
Supports 
Kosovo inde-
pendence?
Discusses 
remedial 
secession?
Right to remedial 
secession in 
international law?
If such a right, 
does it exist 
for Kosovo? Comments
Maldives Yes No - -
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes
Norway Yes No - -
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes
Romania No Yes Yes No
Russia No Yes Yes No
Saudi Arabia Yes No - -
Serbia No Yes No -
Sierra Leone Yes No - -
Spain No Yes No - Only in OP
Slovakia No No - -
Slovenia Yes No - -
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes Only in OP
USA Yes No - -
Venezuela No Yes No -
Vietnam No Yes No -
Sum Yes: 27 25 14 11
Sum No: 16 19 11 3
Total: 43 44 25 14
 
